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Abstract
The majority of research works on the the economics of data privacy are not suitable for ﬁrms that outsource their
business operations. In particular, the computation of security investment does not consider the bilateral security risk,
and the used threat models do not consider the particular aspects of privacy threats and attacks, which show the use of
multiple steps to thief and misuse the information, and depend on the type of the stolen information and its lifetime.
We provide in this work an economic security investment model, allowing ﬁrms, which outsource their IT business
functions, to determine their optimal security investment and the related residual risk. In this work, threats on data
privacy are modeled considering the particular aspects of privacy attacks. A numerical analysis is conducted to analyze
the impact of the quality of detection and reaction to privacy breaches, on optimal investment and residual risk. The
analysis shows that the amount of optimal investment depends on the minimal time period to detect a security breach,
the ability of the customer ﬁrm to react to such an attack as quickly as possible, and also on the type of threat on
private data. In particular it has been shown that for threats related to private information theft, the customer ﬁrm can
take advantage from the delay in detecting attacks at the outsourcing provider side. Moreover, it should not also put
a lot of security investment eﬀort in reducing the reaction time to these privacy attacks. In the contrary, for threats
related to privacy exploitation by self-propagating malware, the customer ﬁrm has not to contact with an outsourcing
company which is not committed to report an attack occurrence within a short delay, and should not to put a lot of
security investment eﬀort in reducing the reaction time to these attacks.
Keywords: Outsourcing, economics of privacy, optimal security investment, privacy threats modeling.
1. Introduction
To remain competitive in the global market and be able to face the challenges of the economic environment, several
ﬁrms may choose to outsource various types of IT and business functions to third parties (e.g., providers, partners).
Despite its strategic, technical, and economic beneﬁts, such an outsourcing comes with important security issues. In
fact, since an outsourcing operation typically involves the storage and processing of a customer ﬁrm’s private data,
the privacy of data, if not well addressed, can aﬀect the success of the outsourcing operation and the business alliance,
and may also lead to long-lasting economic losses, especially when the customer ﬁrms’ reputation is harmed. By
outsourcing their IT operations, customer ﬁrms lose control over their private data. An outsourcing company may
be ineﬃcient in protecting the customer ﬁrm’s data from abuse by its internal employees. Moreover, some these
companies cannot be fully trusted, as they can leak private data of their customers to marketing agencies.
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Given the aforementioned privacy issues, customer ﬁrms need to plan their own protection from potential security
breaches, aﬀecting data privacy, which may occur at the outsourcing ﬁrm side. In particular the following issues
should be addressed: a) what would be the optimal security investment to spend by a customer ﬁrm, when it decides
to externalize its IT business functions ? b) How could a ﬁrm evaluate the security risk of economic loss associated to
an outsourcing operation, and how could it additionally reduce it? C) How can a manager decide whether the security
level oﬀered by an outsourcing company is adequate, in view of the type and value of private data to protect?
Several works were provided in the literature to address the economic aspects of privacy. In [1], a game-theoretic
model is provided to study the impact of new regulations, regarding the mandatory security information disclosure
from the compromised ﬁrms to authorities, on the security investments. The model considers the need for enterprises
to shift between prevention-based and detection-based security control investments. In [2], the main risks and issues
associated to data protection in the outsourcing and oﬀshoring context, are explained. However, no economic model
is proposed to support decision makers in allocating budgets. In [3] the utility based theory is proposed to provide
a model helping ﬁrms to decide whether to invest in internal security controls or to outsource the security service to
security service providers. The Schneier model of Internet security decision-making is used to create a quantitative
simulation of the outsourcing decision. In [4], the authors examined the impact of disclosure of privacy ﬂaws and
security breaches, and dissemination of privacy awareness, on the behavior of consumers and their future purchasing
and trustworthiness of aﬀected companies. In [5], a model is provided to determine the situation where the mandatory
disclosure laws have positive impact on the social cost. They showed that, despite the importance of loss in the case
of disclosure, the impact on the overall care and protection, and also on the social cost is important.
Despite the importance given by the aforecited works to the economics of data privacy, most of them consider
only one side of the risk (within the customer or ﬁrm boundary) on data privacy. The security and economic budget
optimization problem they solve does not consider the type of collaboration between the two companies. Second,
the model of security breach considered by these models is broad enough allowing to cope with general types of
security incidents. However, privacy breaches have particular aspects requiring the development of speciﬁc models.
For example, once a private data is stolen, its instant of misuse by the attacker will highly depend one its lifetime,
which should be one of the parameters to include in the model. Moreover, private data theft and private data misuse
are two types of separate events that need to be distinguished within a scenario of data privacy attack, as both of them
can be conducted by diﬀerent attackers, and at diﬀerent time instants depending on the type of data.
We provide in this work an economic security investment model which is speciﬁc to customer ﬁrms that out-
source their IT business functions and operations. The model allows these ﬁrms to determine the optimal amount of
investment to spend on information security, and assess the residual risk if investment is done, when they contract
with a third party outsourcing company. A numerical analysis is conducted to analyze the impact of a set of security
parameters related to the quality of protection at the customer and outsourcing ﬁrms (e.g., minimal detection period,
response time to a security incident) on the amount of optimal investment and residual risk of loss.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, the economic model we provide considers the involvement of
several stakeholders (e.g., attackers, the privacy protection ﬁrms, data sellers, and outsourcing companies) in con-
ducting and protecting against privacy attacks in the context of an outsourced business activity. Second, we consider
the particular aspects of privacy attacks when determining the expected monetary loss and beneﬁts. In particular, we
distinguish between private data theft and private data misuse attacks, and we provide diﬀerent types of mathematical
functions to model the latter actions, taking into consideration the type and the time value of the stolen data, and the
behavior of the attackers. Third, we show that the amount of investment and the quality of detection to request from
the outsourcing company, are highly dependent on the value of data to protect and the types of threats to counter.
The paper is outlined as follows. The next section describes the stakeholders interacting together, showing their
roles in protecting/compromising/disclosing data privacy, and also identiﬁes the particular aspects of threats and at-
tacks on the data privacy. In section 3, we describe the economic model, and solve the optimal investment problem.
Section 4 analyzes the impact of the type of privacy threats, and timeliness of the detection and reaction on the optimal
amount of investment, the residual risk, and the eﬃciency of protection. The last section concludes the work.
2. Modeling attacks on privacy
We identify and describe in this section the particular aspects of threats on privacy.
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2.1. Description of stakeholders
In the economic model we are describing ﬁve main stakeholders interacting together. Understanding these stake-
holders is important in modeling the investment problem, and analyzing the impact of the contractual relation between
some of these stakeholders on the frequency of privacy attacks and the return of investment in information privacy.
Customer ﬁrm: A company which cooperates with a third party partner or provider to deliver its services. It
outsources part of its business operations and resources (e.g., data, applications, services) from its local information
system to the information system of the third party. Typically, the customer enterprise trusts the outsourcing ﬁrm and
cooperates with it to secure the hosted resources, but nothing can guarantee that: a) these resources, are not mined
for the purpose of marketing and advertising, or leaked and sold to data broker companies (e.g., Intelius, Zabasearch,
PeekYou, PublicRecordsNow); and b) the resources, which are stored and processed by the assets of the partner’s
information system, are eﬃciently secured and protected against internal and external attacks
Private data seller: A data broker ﬁrm, which typically collects billions of records from public websites, sub-
scribed users (which could be potential attackers), and online ﬁrms that have poor privacy records (e.g., google and
facebook accounts). The records could also be collected from untrustable ﬁrms or users that process and manage their
customer ﬁrms’ services and data, or even from malicious users, who conducted successful attacks on the infrastruc-
tures of ﬁrms connected to the cyber space, and leaked the private data they collected. Once the private data seller
collects these records, it packages them and sells them over the cyber space.
Privacy protection ﬁrm: An online security ﬁrm (e.g., Shepard, Abine), which provides a web service for the
privacy protection and data anonymization in the cyber space. The provided service consists in monitoring and
scanning the Internet, in particular the list of famous private data sellers, social networks, and public web sites,
to detect a potential disclosure of the customer ﬁrms’ private information. Once the private information are found
publicized or sold by a third party, an alert is sent to notify the customer and provide it with the necessary support.
As the removal of the private disclosed data from the private data seller depends on the provider’s deletion policy and
procedures, the privacy protection ﬁrm provides a service for doing such a work on behalf of the customer enterprise.
Outsourcing ﬁrm: A third party company which provides, stores, and processes the resources of the customer
ﬁrm, allowing it to design, compose, and execute complex business services. Typically, the privacy of the customer
ﬁrm’s resources is typically shared and distributed between it and the outsourcing ﬁrm. Such a distribution of security
responsibilities, diﬀers from a business process to another, and highly depends on the provided and paid service.
Cyber attacker: A malicious user which succeeds to gains access to the resources of the customer enterprise, and
collects its private data. The collected data can then be misused (e.g., leaked to data sellers, used to execute illegal
transactions). The attacker can be an internal malicious employee in the outsourcing ﬁrm, a remote attacker which
exploits remote vulnerabilities in the outsourcing ﬁrm’s information system, or a malicious entity which ﬁshes the
outsourcing ﬁrm’s employees.
2.2. Understanding privacy attacks
Attacks on data privacy aim to misuse any type of private information owned by organizations and persons. In this
work, we subdivide an attack on data privacy into private data theft, and private data misuse.
A private data theft is an attack scenario, which successfully exploits a security vulnerability on the target system to
get an illegal access to private data (e.g., customers’ data, accounts’ passwords). The privacy breach can be attributed
to a security vulnerability in the system, which can be technical, managerial, or human. The owner of the private data
can be the organization, but also its customers, and partners. The success of a private data theft enables the execution
of recurrent private data misuse attacks, which represent any type scenarios that misuse the already stolen private data
by leaking, selling, or abusing it, or even deliberately introducing a weakness on its protection. A privacy data misuse
can be recurrent, generating each time a direct or indirect ﬁnancial loss. Several forms of misuse can be distinguished,
depending on the type of stolen data:
• Dissemination of the stolen private data (e.g., ﬁnancial data, industry secrets) to harm the company reputation,
aﬀect its market value, and create a shift in customers’ trust level.
• Use of the security credentials (e.g., user accounts’ password) stolen from the compromised system of the victim
company, to harm the information systems of its partners, by exploiting the mutual trust between them.
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• Misuse of the stolen customers’ private data, in the form of identiﬁcation and credit cards number, to commit
ﬁnancial transactions on behalf of these customers.
• Leak of footprint data (e.g., types and versions of the used services, network addresses of critical resources) on
the information system of the victim company or its partner. These information help attackers identifying the
well-known vulnerabilities to harm the related information system.
In practice the execution of a successful private data theft attack does not imply a systematic execution of private data
misuse attack, but generates an additional threat on the user or company owner of the stolen data. Such a threat can be
seen as the probability that the same or another malicious user misuses the stolen private data. The probabilistic nature
of those threats can be attributed to the following observations. First, a time period may separate the two types of
attacks, depending on: a) the availability of the system that can be harmed using the stolen private data, which should
be connected, and ready to receive connections at the moment of private data misus; b) the type of stolen data, which
could be coded in an unintelligible form (e.g., encrypted), requiring a preprocessing (e.g., brute-forcing) before being
ready for use; and c) the will of the attacker to choose the opportune time to leak or exploit the private data, especially
when it could aﬀect the company’s reputation. Second, the misuse of the private data after it is stolen depends on a)
whether the private data theft is deliberate or unconscious. For a deliberate data theft attack, the misuse of the stolen
data, is almost evident; b) the time sensitivity of the stolen information. For example, if the attacker is certainly aware
that the victim outsourcing ﬁrm would probably detect the private data theft and revoke the stolen data, it will try to
misuse it immediately is important. Third, the misuse of the stolen private data depends on, the availability of required
hacking tools, the skills of the attacker, and how challenging is it for him to misuse the stolen data.
2.3. Modeling private data misuse threats
Given the probabilistic aspect of private data misuse attacks, following a private data theft (assumed to occur at
a time instant to), we model the security threat m(t) related to a private data misuse attack, as a continuous function
of time t which produces a value in the interval [0, 1] for a time value higher or equal to To. Diﬀerent forms can be
suggested depending on the type of the stolen private data and the way it is misused. In the following we provide four
examples, as depicted in Figure 1.
C1 threats (Privacy dramatically falling in value): expressed as: m(t) = a e−bt; for a > 0 and b > 0. A threat,
which is equal to a at the moment t = 0, starts to decrease exponentially as times goes by. Such a function is suitable
to model threats related to the misuse of information which could expire or be revoked very soon. For example, if
the stolen information represents the users’ passwords, an attacker is better oﬀ misusing these credentials as soon as
possible, to maximize the likelihood of success.
Figure 1: Private data misuse: threat rate w.r.t. time
C2 threats (privacy declining steadily): ex-
pressed as m(t) = b − at; for a > 0 and b > 0. The
threat decreases linearly until time t = b/a. Each
time period elapsed since time t = 0 has the same
negative eﬀect on the probability that the stolen data
be used to harm again the target user or ﬁrm. This
logic describes a situation where a set of private data
are stolen (e.g., industrial secrets), and each time the
attacker misuses one of them, he/she supposes that an
immediate reaction will be undertaken by the victim
(e.g., to modify or shield it). Consequently he/she
will not use that information again to avoid being
traced back. The threat becomes null when all the
stolen data are misused.
C3 threats (privacy dependent on previous
maliciousness): expressed as m(t) = a − btc if
t < b−
1
c and m(t) = 0 if t ≥ b− 1c ; for a > 0, b > 0 and c > 1. The threat decreases convexly with respect to
time, until reaching zero. This logic describes a situation, quite similar to C2, expecting that the stolen data can be
used to harm several systems. The attacker assumes that each time one of these systems is misused, the owner ﬁrm
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will not only react to shield its system, but il will also communicate that information to other partners susceptible to
be breached. Consequently, the more the attacker misuses the private stolen datasets, and the more the time goes by,
the lower the attacker becomes motivated to continue misusing the stolen private data
C4 threats (privacy dependent on self-propagating malware): expressed as m(t) = a/(1 + exp(−b(c − t))); for
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and b ≥ 0. The evolution of the threat is described using a logistic function, assuming that the stolen private
data will be exploited by an automated malware, which automatically replicates itself from a machine to another. Each
time the malware contaminates a new machine, it uses it to misuse the private data, and also to propagate to other
machines (for example by using the contact addresses stored the compromised machine to send emails containing an
attached copy of the malware and the stolen private data). At the beginning, the threat starts to increase increasingly
as new machines start to be contaminated. After some period of time the threat decreases decreasingly and converges
toward an asymptotic value, as the malware is no longer able to contaminate new machines (all machines have already
been contaminated, or a response has been undertaken on the network).
3. Modeling and solving the optimal investment problem
After deﬁning the diﬀerent stakeholders and modeled the privacy threats, we turn to the modeling and solving of
the optimal security investment problem.
3.1. Deﬁning and understanding the model parameters
The describe in the following the model parameters and assumptions.
Outsourcing ﬁrm. We assume that the outsourcing ﬁrm, has already invested to protect its information system against
security threats. Most of research work on the economics of security assume that providing a complete protection
of an information system is almost impossible and becomes more and more expensive when a high level of security
is needed. Therefore, a residual risk, denoted by Ψ, is inevitably obtained after the investment in security. A secu-
rity audit is conducted once the investment is performed, to uncover the risk exposure, and allow the customers of
this company (which would pay for the outsourcing service) to be aware of the level of security provided to their
outsourced resources. One important aspect of this security audit is that it should: a) guarantee that an intrusion
prevention, detection, and reporting systems are in place so that customers can be notiﬁed quickly if the privacy of
resources is compromised; and b) provide a highly accurate and certiﬁed value of the residual risk Ψ, so that customer
ﬁrms could place the right investment value to additionally this risk based on their investment strategy.
As the occurrence of a security breach on the provider side can lead to loss of private and sensitive customer
resources, result to long-term consequences on the customer reputation, and negatively aﬀect the achievement of the
outsourcing project, we assume that the outsourcing ﬁrm provides a guarantee against ﬁnancial loss due cyber privacy
attacks. The protection policy it oﬀers, which can be modeled using two parameters, namely the coverage rate (α) and
the coverage period (Tc), states that once a security breach occurs, the outsourcing ﬁrm must notify the customer ﬁrm,
and pay out the rate α of all the losses induced by the potential misuses of the stolen customer’s private data, during a
period of time Tc.
The protection policy obliges the outsourcing ﬁrm to disclose information about any detected privacy breach on
the customer data. To avoid the ability of the outsourcing ﬁrm to remain silent, we assume that all the loss generated
between the time of occurrence of the attack and the moment of notiﬁcation, are totally (100%) covered by the
outsourcing ﬁrm. Therefore, the latter should inform as soon as possible the customer to avoid covering (1 − α)
more, since sooner or later the customer ﬁrm will notice the misuse of its private data and will consequently request
compensation.
Obviously, the outsourcing ﬁrm can choose to cover itself against the ﬁnancial risk associated to the mandatory
reimbursement of losses to its customer, by choosing to purchase an appropriate cyber insurance.
Customer ﬁrm. Before additionally investing in information security to protect against privacy attacks, we assume
that the customer ﬁrm starts by assessing the degree of vulnerability of its outsourced private resources to misuse
attacks, assuming that such data is already disclosed. The obtained vulnerability of misuse is denoted by Φ0. The
ﬁrm is also supposed to assess the mean potential loss, say l, induced by each potential misuse of the disclosed private
data. To further reduce Φ0 to a certain level, the customer ﬁrm should invest the monetary amount I in information
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security to design, develop, and acquire the suitable security policy, procedures, services, tools, and hardware, for the
purpose of protecting against any misuse of private data. Several works in the literature [6, 7], provided a mathematical
expression of the residual risk, that we describe with function φ(I,Φ0), where I is the amount of investment. Almost
the whole majority of them argued on the following properties: φ(0,Φ0) = Φ0, φ(I,Φ0) −→ 0
I→+∞
, φ′(I,Φ0) ≤ 0, and
φ”(I,Φ0) ≥ 0, which state that as a ﬁrm invests in information security, the residual risk decreases decreasingly,
making it almost impossible to reach the risk zero. We consider in this paper the risk function provided by the
equation φ(I,Φ0) = Φ0/ (1 + kI), which was widely used to model targeted attacks [8] [9], where k stands for the
eﬃciency of the security investment.
The invested amount I includes also the fees charged by the privacy protection ﬁrm to provide the privacy protec-
tion and data anonymization service. Such a service allows to reduce the mean rate, say λ (denoting the number of
occurrences per unit of time), of private data misuse attacks, since the privacy protection ﬁrm is expected to quickly
detect the disclosure of private data and to interact with data brokers to delete that information, reducing thus the speed
of their sharing and likelihood of their exploitation. We assume that the mean occurrence rate of private data misuse
attacks is a function of the investment J paid to the privacy protection ﬁrm, where the amount J is a portion of I. Such
a function, which we denote byλ(J), is deﬁned over positive values of J, outputs positive values, and is monotonically
decreasing for J > 0. For the sake of clarity, we assume in the remaining part of this paper that λ(J; J = 0) = Λ1
and λ(J; J > 0) = Λ2, with Λ1 > Λ2, to state that a privacy protection company has a unique service to oﬀer to the
customer ﬁrm, by which it would be able to reduce the private data misuse from Λ1 to Λ2. We will analyze later the
impact of Λ2 on the optimal investment.
Attack timeline. We describe in Figure 2 the timeline of the privacy attack scenario. A private data theft attack is
supposed to occur at time to on the provider side. Such an attack is supposed to be detected a short time later. A
privacy attack can be detected by the outsourcing ﬁrm (which can detect the occurrence of a breach on its information
system) at time td1 , or by the customer ﬁrm (which can receive a notiﬁcation from the privacy protection ﬁrm, stating
that it detected the disclosure of a private information) at time td2 . We assume that if the outsourcing ﬁrm detects
the data breach, it immediately informs the customer to reduce to the maximum possible the amount of covered loss
(since the coverage rate α is equal to 1 during the period [to, td1 [), and also to help the customer reacting quickly to
reduce the potential number of future data misuse attacks during the coverage period, as the consequent loss should
be reimbursed in conformance with the rate α. We also assume that the customer ﬁrm is better oﬀ informing the
outsourcing ﬁrm very soon when it receives a notiﬁcation of private data disclosure, from the privacy protection ﬁrm,
so that it can request the coverage of the actual and future data misuse attacks during the coverage period and reduce
their ﬁnancial impact. Given these two assumptions, we suppose in the sequel that td1 = td2 and we denote that value
by td. The time period [to, td1 [ will be denoted by Td.
Once the attack is detected, the provider grants to the customer ﬁrm a period of coverage Tc = [td, tc[ (as deﬁned
previously). At the same moment (td), the customer ﬁrm starts responding to the disclosure of its private data with the
goal of making any misuse of that data impossible. That response takes a period of time Tr. Precisely, the customer’s
information system and resources become resilient to private data misuse attacks at time tr (such that Tr = [td, tr[).
We assume that the private data, already theft, has a remaining lifetime Tl = [to, tl[, after which any attack misusing
it becomes useless, even if no reaction is undertaken (e.g., a stolen password is expected to expire after a period of
time predeﬁned by the ﬁrm’s security policy, a stolen credit card number should expire at the end of validity period).
Therefore, even if a response is not undertaken, or it takes a long time to be achieved, attackers cannot deﬁnitely
generate ﬁnancial losses to the customer ﬁrm.
In this model, while a private data theft is supposed to occur only once, a private data misuse attack can occur
several times starting from the instant to. We have previously deﬁned that rate to be equal to Λi (i = 1 if the customer
ﬁrm invested in information security, and i = 1 otherwise). The stochastic attack arrival model that we use, assumes
that at each period of time 1/Λi, a new attack could occur with a mean probability p¯, but the instant of occurrence is
uniformly distributed over the period [0, 1/Λi].
3.2. Modeling the optimal investment
An security investment at the customer side is considered as optimal, when it maximizes the expected beneﬁt
against private data misuse attacks. We compute the expected beneﬁt P(I) as: P(I) = L(0) − L(I) − I, where:
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Figure 2: Attack timeline
L(0) = (1 − (1 − Φ0) (1 − Ψ)) lΛ1
(
(1 − α)
ˆ Td+Tc
Td
m(t) dt +
ˆ Tl
Td+Tc
m(t) dt
)
(1)
L(I) = (1 − (1 − φ(I,Φ0)) (1 − Ψ)) lΛ2
(
(1 − α)
ˆ Td+Tc
Td
m(t) dt +
ˆ Td+Tr
Td+Tc
m(t) dt
)
(2)
In the remaining part, we denote by X and Y the following expressions:
X = (1 − α) ´ Td+TcTd m(t) dt +
´ Tl
Td+Tc
m(t) dt ; Y = (1 − α) ´ Td+TcTd m(t) dt +
´ Td+Tr
Td+Tc
m(t) dt (3)
The expression (1 − (1 − φ(I,Φ0)) (1 − Ψ)) stands for the rate of vulnerability of the customer private information
to any misuse (it depends on the vulnerability of the provider to private data theft attacks). In the case where I = 0,
we have φ(I,Φ0) = Φ0. A thorough reader would have noticed that the threats we model on data privacy depend
on the incentive of the attacker and the type of stolen data, and not on the degree of protection of these data by the
customer ﬁrm. Since a security breach requires the availability of threats and vulnerabilities to occur (which represent
two independent parameters), we need to multiply the afore mentioned vulnerability rate by the mean value of threat,
to determine the risk of private data misuse attack. We remind that a loss l would potentially happen, in average,
each period of time 1/Λi for i ∈ {1, 2}, and that the rate α will be used to reimburse the customer during the coverage
period. In the case where the customer ﬁrm is able to respond (i.e., I  0) to the detected privacy data theft at the
outsourcing ﬁrm side, the attacks misusing the stolen private data become useless at end of the reaction period. In the
opposite case, where I = 0, no reaction can be undertaken, and therefore, the attacks continue to ﬁnancially damage
the ﬁrm until the end of the data lifetime.
Since an investor wants to maximize the expected beneﬁt through his/her investment, the optimal investment will
be a solution to the equation δP(I)/δI = 0.
3.3. Solving the optimal investment problem
By computing the derivative ofP(I) with respect to I, and replacing φ(I,Φ0) by its expression, we obtain: −L′(I)−
1 = 0. Therefore, we have:
(
(kΦ0lY(1 − Ψ)Λ2) / (1 + kI)2
)
−1 = 0. The optimal investment I∗ satisfying such equality
will be given by: I* =
(√
kΦ0lY(1 − Ψ)Λ2 − 1
)
/k . We provide in Table 1 the diﬀerent expressions of Y which depends
on m(t), by considering the privacy threats C1, C2, C3, and C4.
We deﬁne by R∗ = (L(0) − L(I∗)) /L(0) the optimal rate of gained expected loss at the customer side, once it
invests the optimal amount I∗. Since L(0) includes the expression X deﬁned previously, we develop it in Table 2
depending on the diﬀerent types of threats.
4. Analysis
The aim of this section is to analyze the impact of attacks detection parameters (e.g., attack frequency, period of
detection, period of reaction) at the outsourcing and the customer ﬁrms, and the types of threats, on the optimal value
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Threat m(t) Y
C1 a e−bt − ab
(
e−b(Td+Tr ) + (α − 1)e−bTd − αe−b(Td+Tc )
)
C2 a − bt
(
a (Td + Tr) − b2 (Td + Tr)2
)
+ (α − 1)
(
aTd − b2 (Td)2
)
− α
(
a (Td + Tc) − b2 (Td + Tc)2
)
C3 a (1 − btc)
(
a (Td + Tr) − abc+1 (Td + Tr)c+1
)
+ (α − 1)
(
aTd − abc+1 (Td)c+1
)
− α
(
a (Td + Tc) − abc+1 (Td + Tc)c+1
)
C4 a1+eb(c−t)
(
a
b
) (
(1 − α) ln
(
e−b(c−Td−Tc)+1
e−b(c−Td)+1
)
+ ln
(
e−b(c−Td−Tr)+1
e−b(c−Td−Tc)+1
))
Table 1: Computing the value of Y depending on the type of threat
Threat m(t) X
C1 a e−bt − ab
(
e−bTl + (α − 1)e−bTd − αe−b(Td+Tc )
)
C2 b − at
(
bTl − a2 (Tl)2
)
+ (α − 1)
(
bTd − a2 (Td)2
)
− α
(
b (Td + Tc) − a2 (Td + Tc)2
)
C3 a(1 − btc)
(
aTl − abc+1 (Tl)c+1
)
+ (α − 1)
(
aTd − abc+1 (Td)c+1
)
− α
(
a (Td + Tc) − abc+1 (Td + Tc)c+1
)
C4 a1+eb(c−t)
(
a
b
) (
(1 − α) ln
(
e−b(c−Td−Tc)+1
e−b(c−Td)+1
)
+ ln
(
e−b
(
c−Tl
)
+1
e−b(c−Td−Tc)+1
))
Table 2: Computing the value of X depending on the type of threat
of investment and rate of gained loss. In the following analysis, the coeﬃcients used to draw the functions expressing
the threats are the ones described in Figure 1. We also set the coverage rate α to 85%, the eﬃciency of the security
investment k to 10%, and the mean loss value l to 1000 dollar units (e.g., million, billion). The initial risk at the
customer side Φ0 and the residual risk at the provider side Ψ are both set to 0.5.
Analysis of the optimal investment level with respect to the detection period.. We analyze in Figure 3 the relationship
between the optimal investment and time of detection, considering the diﬀerent types of threats C1, C2, C3, and C4. In
this analysis, we choose to set the mean occurrence rate of private data misuse attacks Λ2 to 10, and the time periods
Tc and Tr to 1 and 2 time units, respectively.
Figure 3: Optimal investment w.r.t. period of detection
From Figure 3, we notice that the four threats
show diﬀerent characteristics. For the three types
of threats C1, C2, and C3, the optimal investment
decreases with the increase of the detection period.
This is not the case, for the type of threats C4, which
shows a logarithmic growth with respect to Td. From
the economic point of view, the customer ﬁrm can
take advantage from the delay in detecting attacks
at the outsourcing provider side, for threats C1, C2,
and C3. The obtained advantage is very important
for threats C1, where the optimal investment is lower
than the other threats, and quickly reaches 0 as long
as the delay increases. In practice, the detection is al-
ways higher than 0, as detecting an attack takes time
to analyze the attacker’s behavior, check if the gen-
erated alerts are not false positives, and prepare the
notiﬁcation to the customer.
Therefore, the outsourcing company has better to focus its investment on enhancing the detection capability of the
used security solutions, so that it can lower the potential amount to reimburse in case of attacks. From the customer
side, spending heavily to protect against privacy attacks, which take a long time to be detected by the outsourcing
ﬁrm, may not pay oﬀ economically. For the case of C4 threats, the optimal amount of required investment increases
quickly as Td increases, and after that starts to reach an asymptotic value. Therefore, the customer ﬁrm has not to
contact with an outsourcing company which is not committed to report an attack occurrence within a short delay. The
customer is better oﬀ setting a shorter value Td as a business requirement, and deﬁning it in the outsourcing contract.
The customer has also to spent the security dollars in additionally decreasing the value of Td by contracting with one
or many privacy protection ﬁrms, that have a great capability in detecting a privacy data disclosure very quickly.
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Figure 4: Optimal investment w.r.t. ratio μ
Analysis of the optimal investment with respect to the
reaction capability of the customer ﬁrm. We deﬁne
by μ the responsiveness ratio μ = Tr/Tc, allowing to
assess the impact of taking a long time to react to a
privacy attack by the customer ﬁrm. Figure 4 shows
the relationship between t
he optimal investment I∗ and the ratio μ, consid-
ering two types of threats C3 and C4. For each type
of threat, two values of Tc are chosen, namely Tc = 1
and Tc = 2 time units, in order to assess the impact of
beneﬁting from a long coverage period to react to an
attack. We set Td to 0.1 time units, loss l to 100 dol-
lar units. We notice that for C3 threats, the optimal
investment increases much rapidly than C4, reaches a
certain pick value, and then plateaus. We also notice
that, for lower values of μ the higher is the value of Tc, the higher will be the amount of required investment. However,
when μ continues to increases, the amount of investment for Tc = 1will be more important than the investment when
Tc = 2. In fact, the rate of loss at the customer side is more important in the Tr − Tc period than in the Tc period.
Since the threats C3 are decreasing in time the loss will be more important for high values of Tc than low values of
Tc, considering a low value of Tr (i.e., low values of μ). However, when μ is high, and therefore the value of Tr is
high, the loss becomes important for low values of Tc, than high values of Tc, since the threats has not decreased so
much when the coverage period ends, and therefore the customer ﬁrm will suﬀer 100% of loss (with a high rate of
threat) until the end of the reaction period. From the economic perspective, the customer ﬁrm has not to put a lot of
security investment eﬀort in reducing the reaction time to privacy threats of type C3, especially when the coverage
period stated by the provider is important. For the case of C4 threats, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ not spending in security,
until the ratio μ reaches a certain level μ. The explanation is that when the diﬀerence between the coverage period and
the reaction period is very low, the expected potential loss is small compared with the cost of the required security
investment, justifying why a security investment is not necessary. An long as μ increases, the required reaction period
becomes important. Consequently, the value of the expected loss due to private data misuse increases, not only due to
the length of the period, but also due to the importance of the threat probability in that period (we remind that the threat
C4 increases with the increase of time). Therefore, the required amount of investment will increase consequently.
Figure 5: Optimal investment w.r.t. private data misuse rate
Analysis of the optimal investment with respect to the
occurrence rate of the attack. We analyze in Figure
5 the evolution of the optimal investment with re-
spect to the attacks occurrence rate, considering dif-
ferent values of coverage rate α, and a threat of type
C1. The values of Td, Tc, and Tr are set to 0.1, 1.5,
and 2, respectively, while l is set to 1000. We no-
tice that the more is the expected frequency of pri-
vate data misuse attacks, and the lower is the cover-
age rate, the higher will be the value of the optimal
investment. Moreover, whatever the value of the cov-
erage rate α is, there is always minimum value under
which the customer ﬁrm is better oﬀ not investing. In
fact, by decreasing the rateΛ2 and increasing the rate
α, the expect potential loss decreases and becomes
small enough to require a security investment. Based
on the analysis of Figure 5, we also notice that the diﬀerence in value between the levels of optimal investments related
to the diﬀerent values of α, becomes important when the rate of attack increases. For a rate of attack is equal to 10, the
increase of α from 0.6 to 0.9, allows the ﬁrm to decrease the value of the I∗ by 35%. This shows the importance that
a customer ﬁrm negotiates the coverage rate when it contracts with an outsourcing ﬁrm, to spare the security money.
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Analysis of the rate of optimal investment over maximal loss, with respect to the rate of attacks occurrence. We deﬁne
by Lˆ the maximal loss that can be observed by a privacy attack (assuming that at each period 1
Λ2
a private data misuse
attack is executed), which can be deﬁned as follows: Lˆ = Λ2l ((1 − α) Tc + (Tr − Tc)) = Λ2l (Tr − αTc). We examine
in Figure 6 the relationship between the rate I
∗
Lˆ (optimal investment per maximum dollar loss) and the occurrence
rate of private data misuse attacks, considering threats of category C1, and three values of Tc: 0.5, 1, and 1.5. In this
analysis, the value of Td and Tr are set to 0.1 and 5 time units.
We notice that until the rate Λ2 reaches a certain value, say Λ2, the customer ﬁrm has no interest to invest in
information security (I∗ = 0). The optimal investment starts to increase quickly, after Λ2 is reached, After it reaches a
maximum value, it starts dropping down to a lower value and plateaus there as long as the rate Λ2 becomes very high.
In fat, when the rate Λ2 is low, the investor ﬁnds that the total expected loss is low with respect to the required amount
of investment. Therefore, it chooses to not invest. However, when Λ2 exceeds Λ2, it also increases the expected
potential loss. Therefore, an investor in information security needs to decrease the breach probability further by
increasing the amount of investment. Such an increase would make the investment no longer optimal for high values
of Λ2, which justiﬁes why I∗ reaches a plateaus. Such a phenomena is more and more noticeable when the coverage
period Tc becomes important. In fact, since the threat probability C1 decreases exponentially with the increase of
time, the more is the period of coverage granted by the provider, the less will be the risk of being attacked in the
remaining period of time Tr − Tc, and therefore the lower will be the optimal investment. Finally, our model shows
that the maximal amount of required optimal investment, when Tc = 0.5, does not exceed 8 of the maximal loss.
Figure 6: Opt. investment over maximal loss per attack w.r.t. attacks
Analysis of the risk of loss with respect to the respon-
siveness ratio μ . We examine in Figure 6 the rela-
tionship between the optimal rate of gained expected
loss R∗ and the responsiveness ratio μ, considering
two classes of threats C1 and C4. We set l = 1000,
Λ1 = 10, Λ2 = 7.5 dollar units, Td = 0.1, Tc = 1
and Tl = 10 time units. The two types of threats
exhibit a diﬀerent behavior depending on μ. For C1
threats, the gained expected loss decreases quickly as
μ starts to increase, and after that it quickly plateaus
due to the exponential behavior of C1 threats. There-
fore, the increase of the ratio μ does not aﬀect the
rate of gained expected loss, which remains around
50% (which is a desirable value). For C4 threats, the
risk of loss starts to be constant, as the C4 are mod-
eled by a logistic function which starts with a very
low value, if the time period is still low. In this analysis, choosing a very low value of μ makes the reaction period
very low and therefore it decreases the expected loss during that period. After that the rate of gained expected loss
decreases with the increase of μ, until reaching 0, making it necessary for the customer ﬁrm to control the duration
of its response time. For the threats C4, a ﬁrm is better oﬀ investing in reaction mechanisms and developing its inci-
dent response plan, in order to make the response time enough low, otherwise the gained expected loss becomes very
low. If lowering the reaction duration is not possible, the managers of the customer ﬁrm have to invest in alternative
solutions such as insurance to lower the potential loss and mitigate the privacy attacks.
The analyses we conducted showed that the amount of optimal investment at the customer ﬁrm side depends on
the minimal time period spent to detect a security breach, the ability of the customer ﬁrm to react to such an attack
as quickly as possible, and also on the type of threat on private data. We found that for threats related to private
information theft (i.e., threats C1, C2, and C3) the customer ﬁrm can beneﬁt from the delay in detecting attacks at
the outsourcing provider side. Moreover, it should not also put a lot of security investment eﬀort in reducing the
reaction time to these privacy attacks. On its part, the outsourcing ﬁrm has to focus in spending the security dollars
in decreasing the eﬃciency of the deployed security solutions to reduce the detection period. For the threats related
to privacy exploitation by self-propagating malware (i.e., threats C4), the customer ﬁrm has not to contact with an
outsourcing company which is not committed to report an attack occurrence within a short delay, and should not to
put a lot of security investment eﬀort in reducing the reaction time to these attacks.
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5. Conclusion
Figure 7: Optimal investment w.r.t. detection period
We focused in this paper on the economics of in-
formation security privacy. We devised a model for
computing the optimal security investment, and the
associated residual risk, in order to protect against
privacy threats, by ﬁrms which contract with third
party providers to outsource their business activi-
ties. The model considers a privacy protection sce-
nario which involves the interaction of several stake-
holders, allowing a customer ﬁrm to reduce the risk
associated to the misuse of its private information,
when the outsourcing company’s information system
is compromised. In this work we modeled the threats
on privacy, by providing diﬀerent mathematical ex-
pressions that take into consideration the nature of
the theft data, its lifetime, and the attacker’s will-
ing to misuse it. Through, the obtained results, we
showed the highest dependency of the required amount of optimal investment to the type of threats to thwart, the qual-
ity of detection at the outsourcing company side, the policy used to cover the caused economic loss, and the ability of
the customer ﬁrm to react quickly to privacy incidents.
In this work, we have only focused on the customer ﬁrm side, and the same approach could be followed to model
the investment at the outsourcing ﬁrm, and analyze the impact of the detection parameters and types of threats on the
optimal amount of investment. The role and eﬀect of the privacy protection ﬁrm and data sellers on the reduction of
the risk of security breach and the amount of investment, are shown through the frequency of attacks and the ability
to detect the privacy attacks earlier. Developing a pricing model for the privacy protection service, and modeling the
diﬀerent types of contractual relations between the stakeholders (the data seller, the privacy protection ﬁrm, and the
customer) could be suggested to increase the eﬃciency of the proposal. Future work, will consider the development
of the optimization model at the outsourcing company side, and the use of the game theory to study the impact of one
stakeholder’s strategy on the outcome of the others, and determine the suitable strategy as a Nash equilibrium.
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